Monday, August 30, 2021

Laotian | From Wuhan to Yangzhou: Where are the shortcomings in the government's ability to control the epidemic?


 

(Translator’s preface: Lao Tian offers his views on the effectiveness of the Chinese government’s response to the pandemic and the importance of relying on the people.)

 

Very early on, I saw a self-proclaimed epidemiological investigator say that the problem caused by the old woman in Yangzhou was serious[1], and that its severity would be amplified by the poor epidemic prevention capacity in Yangzhou (including the small number of contract tracers), and that the epidemic in Yangzhou would be much worse than in Nanjing.

So far, large numbers of infected people have been found in Yangzhou on a daily basis, and it is likely that there is some undiscovered hidden chain of transmission that continues to be at work. Yangzhou's local epidemic prevention capacity is limited and Jiangsu Province's intervention in the Yangzhou outbreak seems to have come a little late.

At present, only China has taken a preventive approach and organised comprehensive prevention and control. Nucleic acid testing of the entire population is only an auxiliary technical tool - because it is not precise enough to detect only 20% or 30% of cases, the key tool is to rely on the epidemiological investigation personnel. The epidemiological investigation relies on personnel to uncover the chain of transmission and then isolate and block the path of transmission until the last hidden chain of transmission has been discovered.

The extreme measure of sealing off the city is in fact an indiscriminate way of blocking the transmission pathway in anticipation of the difficulty of revealing the entire hidden chain of transmission in a short period of time - the option of disconnecting everyone, without exception, from human contact "outside the home". The cost and social impact of such an option would be enormous, but its effectiveness would be greatly reduced if it did not seal off the community.

A friend in Yangzhou disclosed: "There are no infected people in my parents' neighbourhood. Luckily, one person from each family can go out once a day. However, the city bus has stopped and it is not convenient to go out for shopping. There are many retired people in my parents' neighbourhood, and although they have organised a buying group of their own, there are many old people and few who can work, so the shopping still doesn't go well. My parents still won't let me complain, they always think it's not easy for the government and it's okay to get through it on your own."

For a long time, the inability to form a second supply chain for household goods [Note: this article refers to channels other than conventional logistics, i.e.: no need for individuals to go out and shop in brick and mortar shops] was a key shortcoming and a reflection of the government's lack of ability to seal and control. During the closure of Wuhan, it was also impossible to seal off the district for a long time, and it took a long time to set up a second supply chain.

At that time, Wuhan had 40,000 party members and cadres descending into the community, and many volunteers joined the community work. There are about 7,000 districts and 3,000 communities in Wuhan, and the deployment of personnel, on average about 6-7 people to each district, was really quite a lot. However, the community was unable to fully integrate and use these forces; if the deployed personnel were still working under the nose of their "old bosses", the formation of a second supply chain should take less than a week. Wuhan finally sealed the community and organised a channel for the distribution of household goods, but it took almost four weeks to gradually put in place at the end of February. Needless to say, there are still many loopholes and dead ends, and the operation is far from smooth.

In my hometown, Qichun, two weeks before the closure of the community in Wuhan, this measure had been completed-to the point where the supermarket only accepted grid staff[2] and not individual consumers, thus contrasting with the sparseness of government capacity after the closure of Wuhan.

After the Wuhan epidemic, there have been some new developments in commercial channels, such as Meituan and Taobao, which have set up networks to sell vegetables that are close enough to be delivered downstairs in the city, and can partially replace the old commercial channels and act as a substitute during the closure of the district. It is also possible to do a little better during special times of epidemic prevention, if you work with the government or take over a role. Some elderly people who do not know how to use smartphones or shop online will need to be matched up with real people, and this part of the service will need to be supplemented by community or other grid workers.

During the closure of Wuhan, the deployed personnel were poorly connected to the community, and as the community could not locate them, there was no way to assign work to them, while the personnel themselves often just did their work perfunctorily, and for psychological fear or other reasons, they were mostly reluctant to seriously engage in community work. Of course, it is not enough to rely entirely on the strength of the community to supply materials, and this requires the operation of a new logistics system; but to set up a new network, it is definitely necessary to start from the most grass-roots level of the community, to connect with each household of the general population.

The low capacity of the government during the Wuhan closure and the lack of focus at the grassroots level (two house-to-house inspections were carried out for propaganda purposes, which were unnecessary and did not result in any positive closure effect) caused problems that greatly discounted the effectiveness of the closure. Even these flaws and problems were not brought up for public discussion and, as a result, the same problems arose in the middle of the subsequent closures in Shijiazhuang and Yanbian - citizens were not allowed to go out, but the supply chain for subsistence goods was slow to be established. This time in Yangzhou, too, the performance was similar. This shows that the government is not only incapable of solving problems in a timely manner, but also lacks the will and ability to identify real problems and organise public discussions in order to prepare the conditions for subsequent improvements.

The feeling at the time was that there were too many sprayers[3] on the Internet and very few people willing to pay attention to the actual problems. The people who made up the government, and the way its decisions were made by action and inaction, were in a similar position to the frenzy of public opinion on the Internet - not many people were concerned about the actual problems and their solutions.

The second supply chain of materials is the key to the effectiveness of the sealing of the city, otherwise it would have to rely on old commercial channels and outbound purchases, which discounts its effectiveness.

The overwhelming majority of the population, like friends and relatives, supported the closure of the city, which was a key way in which "people power" supported the prevention of the epidemic, and although there were significant shortcomings in government capacity, comprehensive control measures could still be applied.

It seems that the role of people power support comes first in terms of the government taking proactive measures to prevent the epidemic, the government doing the right thing comes second, and the role of hospitals and the technical power of the capitalist approach to intervention takes a back seat. The extraordinary success of China's epidemic preparedness is largely the result of people power support, and of course the government's efforts in the right direction (albeit not very good - concentrating on the sluggishness of the supply chain), with the power of capital and technology only taking a back seat.

As it stands, it is unlikely that the New Coronavirus evolved naturally and is likely to have come from a US (possibly individual, corporate or governmental action) biological warfare agent, and if that is the case, it is clear that the US and the West are out of the picture this time, lacking the critical support of the people's power, and they have no way to end it.

Before the new pandemic, there was an assessment of the capacity of countries to prevent and control infectious diseases, and the United States scored highest and was ranked first. However, it is the support of people's power, not capital (technical) power or government capacity, that plays a major role in the epidemic prevention process, and how this people's power should be measured and evaluated is clearly something that experts from all walks of life in a capitalist, alienated society are not familiar with.

In essence, the government's efforts need to be directed towards strengthening the power of the people to make a difference - to make people's lives worry-free, thereby maximising the interpersonal chain of communication and blocking the path of transmission of the virus - in order to obtain a better proactive response to the epidemic.

  August 12, 2021

 

 

 

 



[1] A 64-year old woman was arrested early in August after she had travelled from Nanjing to Yangzhou, concealing her itinerary and causing a flare-up of Covid-19 cases. Nanjing already was in the throes of a flare-up, and residents travelling to other cities were required to report their itineraries to the relevant Public Security Bureaus.

[2] Grid workers are responsible for a grid or section of a city, including street shops, residential, rental housing, factories, high-rise buildings and so on. Their task is to patrol these places every day for security risks and welfare issues, but they have no law enforcement powers. They can control their own working hours so long as they complete the quota of weekly reports.  They have an identifying vest but do not have special professional protective measures, and as they are always door-knocking there is a risk of infection. Many complain of overwork and shortages of staff.

[3] A sprayer is someone who uses social media to make accusations without logic or facts. A person who likes to make wild accusations against others without being reasonable. A person is not a sprayer if they criticise in a reasonable way (presenting facts and reasoning), even where their knowledge is limited. Spraying is not as intense and obsessed as trolling, but it can develop into trolling.

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