Gramsci and the wrong ideas of China's contemporary left

 

Preface: I have translated this from the Red China website in China.  The existence of such a website in China, to me, is evidence of some ongoing ideological contestation carried out under the conditions of a sustained “fake” socialism which is led by a capitalist-liner Communist Party. The criticism of Gramsci in a Chinese context is of interest to Communists in the West long familiar with the Gramscian concept of the “hegemonic bloc”, which dominated 1960s New Left radicalism. There is much to admire in Gramsci, but the critique below rings true in terms of what I remember of the way Gramsci was used by the New Left in the 60s. Any errors in the translation are mine.  The bold highlighted sections are as they appear in the original.

...............................

Gramsci and the wrong ideas of China's contemporary left

Author: Jinggangshan Guardian  Antonio Gramsci was one of the most important Marxists in the twentieth century and the number one representative of "Western Marxism". His thought is not only a reflection on the international communist movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, but also has a profound influence on the left-wing progressive thought of all countries in the world today. In China, grams of "ideological leadership", "organic intellectuals", and "modern monarchs" have attracted a large following among scholars and young left-wing activists in the Academy of Arts and Sciences. However, Gramsci's thought deviates from historical materialism, and in addition to creating some dazzling theoretical "tension" and romantic fantasies about the role of intellectuals, it actually hinders the correct judgment of the development of Chinese social class contradictions by the Chinese left-wing progressive movement. This paper briefly combs through the basic context of Gramsci's thought, the main problems of Gramsci's thought, and the connection between Gramsci's thought and many wrong ideas of the contemporary Chinese left-wing progressive movement. Positional warfare: the basic context of Gramsci's thought Gramsci's ideas were born against the backdrop of the success of the socialist revolution in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century and the subsequent failure in Europe. Gramsci's exploration of revolutionary theory revolves around two central questions: First, why did the successful revolution in Russia fail in Western Europe? Secondly, what are the basic conditions for the success of the Western European revolution? To answer these two questions, Gramsci re-examined the basic structure of capitalist society. Gramsci agreed with Marx's division of economic base and upper superstructure, as well as Marx's view of the content oof the superstructure, that is, the superstructure is divided into political superstructure and ideological superstructure. In Gramsci's view, the political superstructure refers to the violent organs of the state, the basic function of which is to "suppress" the working class, so that it is forced to obey the ruling class-dominated social order. Gramsci usually refers directly to the political superstructure with the word "state". Ideological superstructure refers to the social science, religion, folklore and other social and cultural elements mastered by the ruling class, the basic function of which is to blind the working class and let it actively "identify" with the ruling class. Gramsci also refers to the ideological superstructure as "civil society." By contrast, "state" is a hard iron fist, "civil society" is soft velvet gloves, the latter is responsible for psychological persuasion, the former is responsible for physical "persuasion". If the socialist revolution is to succeed, it must clean up the superstructure of capitalism, that is, to overthrow the bourgeois-dominated "state" and "civil society" at the same time. Gramsci believes that the political superstructure is dominant and concentrated, and that it is less difficult to overthrow it. According to the historical experience of the Russian Revolution, only a firm revolutionary party needs to master a certain amount of armed forces in a short period of time to be able to paralyze the bourgeois ruling center in major cities and gain power. This short-term-based revolutionary strategy requires the revolutionary party to maintain a keen judgment on the rapidly changing political environment, to invest the most elite backbone in the most vulnerable time and place of the bourgeoisie, to concentrate all the forces on this point when the local power contrast begins to favor the revolutionary side, so that the bourgeoisie quickly loses its balance in political, military and psychological expectations, thus completing the revolutionary task of small-scale, weak and strong. Gramsci vividly refers to the struggle to overthrow the political superstructure as a "movement war", meaning that the essence of such a struggle is to step forward and focus on the overall breakthrough, regardless of local gains and losses. The struggle to overthrow ideological elements is different. The elements of the ideological superstructure are hidden, scattered, ubiquitous and deeply rooted in people's hearts, and it is very difficult to overthrow them. The bourgeois regime was overthrown, but the concept of private ownership did not die out voluntarily; the church was dismantled, but religious consciousness was not directly dissipated; reactionary armies were disbanded, but nationalism was not dissolved on the spot. The iron fist of the dictatorship can be broken with one blow, and the velvet gloves can disperse the power of the revolution. To seize power is to ride the wind and waves, and to reform ideology is to sail against the current. The revolutionaries can only fight the ruling class one step at a time, repeatedly, on one key ideological point after another. Yesterday it was over whether 996[1] was a "blessing", today it is over the historical significance of the Cultural Revolution, tomorrow it is over whether the person who gives birth to a child must raise the child, and the day after tomorrow it is over whether it makes sense to "lie flat".[2] It was not until all moral heights were occupied by ideas representing the working people, and until the working people generally realized that their own interests were the interests of society and that the bourgeoisie was both class enemies and national scum, that it could be declared that the ideological superstructure had been completely crushed. This is what Gramsci calls ideological "positional warfare".  The 'war of movement' against the 'state' and the 'war of position' against 'civil society' determined Gramsci's view of the historical fate of the Russian and Western European revolutions and the historical fate of the revolutions in Western Europe. In Gramsci's view, the development of Russian capitalism had not been able to produce an independent bourgeoisie and, as a latecomer, the development of Russian capitalism has always been led by the state. Russia's "civil society" was still in its infancy, and the ideological superstructure had not yet been planted firmly and deeply into the lives of working people. The dependence of "civil society" on the "state" made it possible for the Russian Revolution to be accomplished in one fell swoop. Once the Tsarist regime and the bourgeois provisional government had been defeated, the Russian Revolution would have succeeded and the world would have been set in motion. But the situation was different in Western Europe, where, in Gramsci's view, the bourgeoisie had not been fostered by the state. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie in Western Europe took state power only after it had established solid relations of production and ideological leadership, and the state was dependent on civil society rather than the other way round. Even if the revolutionary party defeats the bourgeois "state" in a "war of movement", the bourgeois "civil society" still looms large, and it can still exchange its ideological leadership for money, men, guns and all other material forces, and eventually destroy the revolution with its own hands. In the more fully developed capitalist countries of Western Europe, the political superstructure was an 'outer trench' that could be crossed at any time, while the ideological superstructure was a 'permanent fortification' that had to be assaulted. The failure to breach this fortification was the fundamental reason for the failure of the revolutions in Western Europe. Since the last revolution in Western Europe fell in front of the ideological superstructure, the main problem of the current revolution is how to fight the ideological "war of position". According to Gramsci, the essence of the ideological "war of position" is the struggle of the various classes for ideological leadership. If a class holds the ideological leadership, then the particular interests of that class will be accepted by the majority as the general interests of society. For example, the mechanism behind "business is a public good" is that only when there is profit will there be investment, and only when there is investment will there be employment. The practical meaning is that the interests of the bourgeoisie (profits) are consistent with those of the vast majority of members of society (employment), and that when the interests of the bourgeoisie are satisfied, the overall interests of society will be guaranteed, and any infringement of the interests of the bourgeoisie is an infringement of the interests of society as a whole. If the vast majority of members of a society believe that "business is the good", the bourgeoisie can firmly grasp ideological leadership. On the contrary, if the vast majority of members of a society believe that capitalists are parasites, the ideological leadership of the bourgeoisie will crumble. So, who will fight for ideological leadership for the proletariat and the working masses in general? Gramsci gave this important historical task to the "organic intellectuals". The so-called "organic intellectuals" are political activists who have a clear sense of class and have an "organic" connection with the class they represent, and whose main purpose is to serve the interests of that class. The more organic intellectuals there are in which class, the higher the quality, and the more united the team, the more that class can dominate the struggle for ideological leadership. If the organic intellectuals of the working people prevail, then the ideological superstructure of the bourgeoisie can be dissolved more quickly and the necessary conditions for the success of the revolution be created. Although every ordinary worker has the potential to become an organic intellectual, due to financial and material resources, the organic intellectuals of the working people are still mainly composed of former members of the modern petty-bourgeoisie who betrayed the interests of their class. According to Gramsci, political parties are the highest form of organisation of the organic intelligentsia of each class, the 'general intelligentsia' of each class. Drawing on the doctrine of Machiavelli's The Prince, political parties are also referred to by Gramsci as 'modern princes'. In The Prince, Machiavelli calls for a leader (i.e. a prince) who is virtuous, who has a heart for the masses, who is decisive, who dares to challenge uncertainty, who uses morality but is not bound by it. This leader, a continuation of the glory of the past and a pioneer of the modern era, is the personification of the Italian national liberation movement. Gramsci believed that the proletarian party should play a similar role to this leader in the class struggle. This 'modern prince' mobilises and integrates the scattered, unconscious class “in itself” into a unified, conscious class “for itself”, thus becoming the embodiment of the long-term and global interests of working people. The long-term and global interests of the working people are thus personified. In the struggle against the bourgeois ideological state apparatus, the "modern prince" is the most merciless expositor and critic of bourgeois ideology and bourgeois legal power, the proletarian commander in the ideological "war of position". In this way, Gramsci's revolutionary theory shows a clear logical line: intellectuals inspired by the cause of the working people become the "organic intellectuals" of the working people. "Organic intellectuals" organizations become political parties to represent the interests of the working people and adopt policies in line with the interests of the working people, and promote the formation of "the interests of the working people equal to the overall interests" of the ideological leadership, to win the ideological " war of position." After breaking down the ideological superstructure of the bourgeoisie, the " war of movement " of the political struggle  was adopted to destroy the superstructure of its politics and achieve the ultimate victory of the revolution. The victory of the Russian Revolution was because it did not require a long-term tug-of-war of ideological "positions", and the failure of the Western European Revolution was due to the failure of the Social Democratic Party to resist the erosion of bourgeois ideology on its members and the working masses in general.  History, or materialism? The main problem with Gramsci's ideas As mentioned above, Gramsci believed that only after winning the ideological "battle of position" would the proletariat have the preconditions to fight a class duel with the bourgeoisie in the political sphere. At the same time, he realised that without first gaining power, the proletariat would not have the economic and social resources to support a large number of "organic intellectuals" to carry out political agitation, even if they did not take off work. Unlike the "war of movment" of Lenin's "vanguard party", Gramsci's ideological "war of position" was always just a contest between the absolute power of the two classes of "organic intellectuals". Without an absolute power advantage, there can be no victory. And without victory, there can never be an advantage. Gramsci is caught in a circular argument here, in which the conditions do not exist without first assuming that the conclusion is valid. The direct cause of Gramsci's circular argument was his erroneous summary of the failure of the socialist revolutions in Western Europe. According to Gramsci, the failure of the revolutions in Western Europe was due on the one hand to the incompetence of the Social Democratic Party, which lost ground in the ideological struggle, and on the other hand to the fact that the Western European bourgeoisie had a well-developed and solid "civil society". The ideological situation was one of strength and weakness, and the Social Democrats were unable to overcome it with their own initiative, leading to defeat. Gramsci was right to see the solidity of bourgeois ideology. But he was naive to imagine that it could be overcome by adopting some less stupid or cowardly or treacherous policy of principle in the historical conditions of Western Europe at the time. The proletariat in Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century was the proletariat in the countries at the heart of the capitalist world system, and their wages and other benefits not only met the basic needs of the reproduction of their labour, but even included a portion of the excess surplus value exploited by the bourgeoisie from abroad. Under such circumstances, Western European workers were faced with a major historical choice, either to fight with their capitalists for the long-term and overall interests of proletarian liberation, or to obey the rule of the bourgeoisie for local and short-term interests, so as to continue to enjoy a better life relative to the working people of the peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, and even to help the bourgeoisie to compete for empire, expand the colonies and share more of the surplus value from overseas. Despite the rhetoric that "workers have no homeland", the main Western European workers' political parties and the workers' movement had all chosen the latter. The short-term interests of workers were enormous and coincided with bourgeois interests, and the Western European workers were far from surviving without overthrowing capitalism, and therefore had no revolutionary potential. Engels lamented the "bourgeoisification" of workers throughout Britain at the end of the nineteenth century, and Lenin was more outspoken in pointing out the existence of a "worker aristocracy". The reason why the bourgeoisie in Western Europe was able to control ideological leadership was that it could convince workers that "defending the motherland" is to defend themselves, not because the bourgeoisie grasps the magic of ideology, not because the bourgeois political parties know more about the imperial art of the "modern prince" than proletarian parties, but simply because the interests of the bourgeoisie in the core countries and the short-term local interests of the working class are indeed consistent. What is classified as ideological leadership by Gramsci is in fact a broad class compromise that exists objectively in the core country in a particular historical period, and it is the inevitable result that the social contract of the capitalist world system which covers the working class in the core country. At any major historical juncture, class interests have always determined ideology, not the other way around. Gramsci's thinking about the reasons for the failure of the revolution stopped in the realm of ideology, and his summing up of the lessons of the revolution could only do so by going from ideology to ideology. Last time it was the ideological work that was not done properly, so let's do the ideological work properly this time. This reflects a deeper question in Gramsci's thinking. If revolutions can be won by capturing ideological leadership, and if the loss or gain of ideological leadership determines, rather than merely reflects, the contrast in class power, then what are the underlying causes of the evolution of social form? Does social existence determine social consciousness or does social consciousness determine social existence? And what is the meaning of historical materialism? Gramsci is clear in his answer to this question. In his view, historical materialism is not an application of the philosophy of dialectical materialism to the socio-historical sphere, but a tension-filled dialectical unity between social existence and social consciousness that emerges from human historical practice. Historical materialism should therefore emphasise not a 'metaphysical', 'vulgar', 'economically deterministic' materialism, but a 'practical', 'humanitarian' historical process. Dialectical unity is a good thing, but it is to be feared that without serious "debate" and serious "proof", it is "unified" in a confused way, especially if it is also "unified" in the wrong way. Gramsci's "practical materialism" is a typical example of this. Social consciousness can of course react on social existence, and this reaction (the so-called "tension" of practice) can be large or small, reflecting the individual appearance of human subjective agency influencing the course of history to a greater or lesser extent. But where is the limit of the 'tension'? Beyond how far does human initiative lose its power to change the material world?  The correct answer to this question is the key to understanding historical materialism. And Gramsci, and all of Gramsci's followers in China and abroad, have never been able to answer this question head-on. Behind its silence or flickering rhetoric, there is in fact an implicit answer: the scope of this "tension" is infinite. People, classes, "organic intellectuals", "modern princes", whoever he/she/it is, as long as they have the ideological leadership, can determine the success or failure of the revolution according to their own will, determine the course of history. Social existence is thus "unified" into social consciousness, and the inevitability and regularity of history is lost in the arrogant clamour of criticism of "economic determinism" and "vulgar materialism", as well as in the flashy rhetoric of "tension", "practice" and "humanism". From the historical materialist point of view, where exactly is the limit of human subjective initiative? In terms of the relationship between the individual and the class, this limit lies in the fact that there is an individual who betrays the interests of the class, but no class who betrays the interests of the class. In terms of the relationship between class interests and class ideology, this limit lies in the fact that the ideology of a class cannot depart from its immediate and short-term interests in a permanent and systematic way. Specifically, there can be no global workers' struggle aimed at challenging the fundamental system of capitalism while there is still a broad class compromise between labour and management. At this time, it is easy to identify a large number of "spiritual capitalists" even within the most oppressed groups of workers. Likewise, class conflict heats up when the space for compromise between the two classes disappears and the most pressing interests of each side can only be realised by further squeezing the other. There will be a de facto, rather than a potential, convergence between the long-term interests of the working people to overthrow capitalism and establish communism and the short-term interests of the working people to work and live with dignity. When the long-term and short-term interests of the working people are all hostile to the bourgeoisie, and the existence of the bourgeoisie itself makes the working people neither able to see the future nor tolerate the present, the ideological leadership of the bourgeoisie, which seems to represent the interests of society as a whole, dissipates. The outcome of the ideological 'war of position' is therefore determined essentially by class interests rather than by the activities of 'organic intellectuals'. The only correct interpretation of historical materialism can be that the development of social history is subject to the basic laws of dialectical materialism. Any summing up of the experience of past revolutions and any strategic conception of future revolutions can only be based on the objective development of class contradictions and not on the hope that the "organic intellectuals" will be able to accomplish what is practically impossible for them. The circular paradox in Gramsci's theory is essentially his faulty summary of revolutionary history. His misconceptions about revolutionary history inevitably gave rise to, or were originally derived from, a misunderstanding of the laws of socio-historical development. These misunderstandings of the core issues opened the door to the subsequent descent of "Western Marxism" into "postmodernism".  The connection between Gramsci's thought and the wrong ideas of the left-wing progressive movement in contemporary China Gramsci's ideas were widely translated into China after the 1980s and occupied a prominent place in the pulpits of the Marxist and philosophical schools of China's 'top' universities. For young left-wing students studying at 'top' universities, Gramsci and Western Marxism became a theoretical and ideological alternative to Stalin's version of theoretical texts. For those left-wing students who could afford to study abroad, Gramsci was an obligatory subject. Gramsci's ideas profoundly influenced the views of many left-wingers on the current state of the class struggle and the future of the revolution in China. In the eyes of the academics who followed Gramsci, the most valuable aspect of his ideas was ideological hegemony. As mentioned earlier, the battle for ideological hegemony was a hard-fought 'battle of position', where the competition was over which side had more people, more articles and more propaganda outlets. Gramsci's view was that the 'organic intellectuals' of the working people should reach out to the press and educational institutions and 'capture' them with aggressive propaganda, influencing the petty bourgeoisie in its state of wavering and the proletariat in its "comfortable" state. At the same time, the "organic intelligentsia" should form political parties, enter the formal democratic process, give a voice to the proletariat in parliament and become the banner of proletarian ideology and the rallying point for political action. Gramsci's strategy, based on the current political situation in Western Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century, although not ultimately decisive, was at least something that could be started. It was a beautiful ideal, but it dissipated as soon as it met the current situation in China today. In the absence of either political freedom or political democracy, there is simply no possibility for the progressive left-wing movement in China to compete on a level playing field with the bourgeoisie (even formally) for ideological leadership. Therefore, the first step towards seizing ideological leadership is to break the dictatorship of the Chinese bourgeoisie and to 'legitimise' the struggle for ideological leadership itself. Today China is a semi-peripheral country in the world system and does not have a large amount of surplus value from abroad to mitigate class conflicts at home. China's position in the division of labour in the world system determines that its process of capital accumulation and the fundamental interests of the bourgeoisie are based on the brutal exploitation of labour.  The bourgeois dictatorship without democracy and freedom is the most suitable political system for Chinese capitalism, and the Chinese bourgeoisie does not have enough economic resources to meet the economic and political demands of the working people under the conditions of free democracy. It is obviously more realistic to employ cyber police, auxiliary police and triads than to pay high wages and benefits, shorten labour hours and reduce labour intensity. Only when the Chinese bourgeoisie loses control over the class contradictions within the country will it be possible to open up to democratic freedoms. But by that time, China will have long since entered the age of the herd, and the working people will have long since practised the great democracy of the proletariat and the positive freedoms of socialism in the power vacuum left by the retreat of the bourgeoisie. So the first step in seizing ideological leadership would be to destroy the bourgeois dictatorship that was so vital to Chinese capitalism. This is the equivalent of asking the enemy to borrow a gun as a first step in order to arrest them. How can it be possible to seek the skin of a tiger?[3] For some young left-wing activists, Gramsci's idea of the 'organic intellectual' was more appealing. Gramsci spoke of the need for the 'organic intelligentsia' of working people to draw empirical material from the lives of working people and to understand the short-term and immediate interests of working people. At the same time the 'organic intellectual' should also consciously transmit theories about the long-term interests of the class to the working people. In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with this, and there is even a sense of "from the masses, to the masses". However, whenever there is a concrete conflict between the short-term interests and long-term interests of the masses, the empirical materials obtained from the people's lives lose their important position in Gramsci's theory, and the "will", "morality" and "leadership ability" of "organic intellectuals" become the determining factors. When the long-term and short-term interests of the masses are not in conflict, Gramsci's theory can still rain on both, but when they are, the logical integrity of Gramsci's theory can only be achieved by abandoning the short-term interests of the masses. In other words, Gramsci's theory is no longer compatible with the fundamental reality of the class struggle whenever a major choice is at stake. From the perspective of historical materialism, true Marxist revolutionary intellectuals can certainly play a role, but their role is never to subjectively "eliminate" the conflict between the long-term and short-term interests of the masses by ignoring their short-term interests. When the long and short term interests of the masses have converged due to the development of the objective contradictions of capitalism itself, so that the struggle of the masses for short term and immediate interests is at the same time a struggle for long term and fundamental interests, the dilemma of collective action is resolved by sobriety, firmness of will and courageous self-sacrifice, catalyzing a chain reaction of resistance and igniting a spark of fire. Without understanding this, one cannot truly understand the interests of the masses, and on the question of the relationship between intellectuals and the masses, one will increasingly deviate from the "mass line" of participation in mass movements and move closer and closer to the elite "indoctrination theory" of "moving the  masses". Gramsci's 'modern princes', or political parties, are the organisational nucleus of the political and ideological struggle of the 'organic intelligentsia'. If the success or failure of the class struggle depends primarily on the ownership of the ideological leadership, which is always in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which possesses vast resources and a solid ideological "position", it is clear that the bourgeois parties are better "modern princes" than the proletarian parties. If the bourgeoisie mobilises widely against the masses who recognise its ideological leadership in order to preserve the process of capital accumulation, the proletarian "modern prince", overwhelmed in both material and ideological struggle, cannot in any way compete with it. The corollary of Gramsci's thinking is that the capitalist state can develop into a fascist state at any time, and that it is up to the bourgeoisie to develop or not to develop into a fascist state. For the followers of Gramsci in China, fascism is both a logical dead end and an emotional black hole. To admit that the Chinese bourgeoisie holds the door to the road to fascism is to admit that the fate of the socialist revolution is entirely in the hands of the bourgeoisie. If the bourgeoisie lets it live, if they give it freedom and democracy, it could live on; if the bourgeoisie lets it die, if it puts on the brown shirt with the fascist collar, it could only be hanged and killed. The most radical theoretical 'tension' eventually degenerates into the most radical defeatism. In the face of inevitable and complete failure, everything is treated as a lifeline. Gramsci's followers in China today are frightened by the rise of "statism", by the bourgeoisie's self-aggrandizing propaganda for a "strong state", and by the fear that the "entry science" will destroy the left-wing progressive movement. On the other hand, it offered an olive branch to all political forces that did not seem to be allies of the authoritarian system, including but not limited to the declining liberals, the anti-Chinese thugs in Hong Kong, the "democratic" politicians in the West, and even the "private" enterprises that advocated privatisation against state-owned enterprises. Instead of inspiring the people with the hope of revolutionary victory and a better life, they deceive and intimidate them with the fear of the illusory "Chinese fascists". When the "modern princes" were reduced to  "revolutionary hacks" supported by lies, Machiavelli's idea of national liberation was completely vulgarised and the progressiveness of Gramsci's contemporary followers vanished. The "position war" that can never be won, the "organic intellectuals" who are forever obsessed with fantasy, and the "modern monarchs" who are forever weak, constitute the basic elements of Gramsci's thinking in contemporary China. Having departed from historical materialism, neither Gramsci nor his contemporary followers can make a correct summary of the historical socialist revolution, nor can they make a correct judgement on the determinants and changing trends of the current contrast of class forces in China. The Gramscian ideology prevalent among the Chinese petty-bourgeois left today is essentially the theoretical appearance of the confused mentality of many Chinese leftists who do not believe in either the people or themselves. The social basis of this confused mentality is the long-standing monopoly of petty-bourgeois intellectuals and students on left-wing discourse during the normal rule of the bourgeoisie while remaining relatively isolated from direct class struggle. This isolation allowed them to think of revolution and counter-revolution without actually experiencing it. With the rapid sharpening of class contradictions and the radicalisation of the working people in general, the class composition of the progressive left-wing movement in China will increasingly reflect the class structure and contradictions in China, and the number of radicalised proletarians and semi-proletarians will greatly exceed that of the left-wing petty bourgeoisie. At that time, the working people of China will use their courage and wisdom to accomplish the historical task of the Chinese revolution, and the "Gramscian fervour" at this stage will gradually be buried in history as a fork in the road of this Chinese revolutionary quest. Gramsci and china's contemporary left-wing wrong idea - Red China Network (redchinacn.net)

 

---

[1] The 996 working hour system (Chinese: 996工作制) is a work schedule practiced by some companies in the People's Republic of China. It derives its name from its requirement that employees work from 9:00 am to 9:00 pm, 6 days per week; i.e. 72 hours per week. A number of Chinese internet companies have adopted this system as their official work schedule. Critics argue that the 996 working hour system is a flagrant violation of Chinese law. It has been called "modern slavery."

[2] Lying flat or lying down is a popular online term in the People's Republic of China that began in 2021, meaning that young people who are disappointed with the country's repressed work culture, rather than following social expectations and persisting in their struggle, choose the attitude of "lying flat". It is seen as a way to combat the "internalization" of society. Its specific connotations include "do not buy a house, do not buy a car, do not marry, do not have a baby, do not consume" and "maintain a minimum standard of subsistence, refuse to become a money-making machine and exploited slaves".

[3] To conspire with a tiger for its skin is a Chinese idiom, pronounced yǔ hǔ móu pí, meaning to negotiate with a tiger in order to peel off its skin. It often refers to discussing with an evil person and asking him to sacrifice his own interests, which is definitely impossible.