Who made a serious mistake during the Great Leap Forward?

 Preface: Western bourgeois scholars and the Dengist revisionists in China both ascribe the faults of the Great Leap Forward to the arbitrariness and impetuosity of Mao Zedong.  These slanders are used to justify anti-Communism in the West and Deng's departure from the socialist road through his "reforms", in China. However, various leftist websites in China are subjecting the era, and Mao's part in it, to a new analysis.  This one is from the Utopia website, which has had a reputation as a Maoist website and closed down from time to time.  It now posts Xi Jinping's speeches and is more or less tolerated. It is my translation and therefore so are any errors in this version.

The author of this piece exonerates Mao of the charges against him, and asks pointed questions about who was really to blame.  A longer article by Lao Tian (a pen name), answers those questions. I'll try and translate that one too and put it up.

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Who made a serious mistake during the Great Leap Forward?

　Volume II of the History of the Party describes the Great Leap Forward in the style of the Spring and Autumn Annals[1]

In order to confuse right and wrong and to pin the so-called mistakes on Chairman Mao alone, the History of the Party, Volume II, pages 500 to 503, section 4 “Lessons from the 'Great Leap Forward' and the Rural People's Commune Movement", uses the style of the Spring and Autumn Annals in this way.:

The first sentence of the first paragraph is "The Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement, which began in 1958, were serious setbacks in the process of exploring China's own socialist construction." They first beat it to death with a stick, and then talk about it. Perhaps fearing that people might not accept it, it goes on to say something about Mao's subjective will being good. It seems to be an excuse for Chairman Mao, but in fact it is a further confirmation of the usual writing style of the literati, which is to turn black and white upside down. The second paragraph, "At that time, people sincerely believed, based on past experience… that there seemed to be nothing that could not be done". Who believed that "there was nothing that could not be done"? The book doesn't say. But reading the context, you must have thought it was about Mao Zedong.

 In short, the so-called lesson of the Great Leap Forward was that because Mao Zedong did not respect the laws, made serious mistakes and acted arbitrarily, the author, paraphrasing the Resolution on the History of the Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the “Resolution”), said: "It was because of insufficient experience in socialist construction, insufficient understanding of the laws of economic development and the basic situation of the Chinese economy, and more importantly, because of the complacency fostered by Comrade Mao Zedong and many leading comrades at the central and local levels who had become smug about their successes, were impatient for quick results and overestimated the role of man’s subjective will and efforts. In their haste to achieve results, they exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective efforts, and launched the 'Great Leap Forward' campaign and the rural people's communes campaign rashly after the general line was proposed, without serious investigation, research and pilot projects, making the left-leaning mistakes marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and a 'communist wind ' as the main symbols of the left-leaning mistakes that spread seriously." The mistakes were Mao's, others were just "many leading comrades" who made mistakes.

In short, the so-called lesson of the Great Leap Forward is that Mao Zedong did not respect the law, made serious mistakes, and acted arbitrarily. The author used the "several historical resolutions of the Party since the founding of the People's Republic of China" (hereinafter referred to as the Resolution) is: "due to our lack of experience in socialist construction and inadequate understanding of the laws of economic development and of the basic economic conditions in China, all the more so because Comrade Mao Zedong and quite a few leading comrades, both at the centre and in the localities, had become smug about their successes, were impatient for quick results and overestimated the role of man’s subjective will and efforts." “After the general line was formulated, the Great Leap Forward and the movement for rural people’s communes were initiated without careful investigation and study and without prior experimentation”, which led to the serious spread of left-leaning errors marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and a 'communist wind'. The mistake is Mao Zedong's, and the others are just "a lot of leading comrades" who have made mistakes. The words "quite a few leading comrades" is wonderful, giving the impression that "a few comrades", and "all the more so because Comrade Mao Zedong" is in front of "many leading comrades in the central and local governments" is a wonderful match, because it is easy to give people the impression that only "Comrade Mao Zedong" made mistakes, hence, others do not feel wrong.

This statement should be the most authoritative, but I do not believe it, because I have carefully studied the authoritative works of five people in this period: Mao, Liu, Zhou, Chen and Deng, and my conclusion is the opposite.

Second, the writings during the period of the Great Leap Forward of the five people: Mao, Liu, Zhou, Chen and Deng

The Collected Works of Mao Zedong, the Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, the Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, the Selected Works of Chen Yun and the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping were all edited and published by the Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the 1990s, i.e. almost simultaneously after the Resolution, so they are comparable. The people are all one group of people and the guiding ideology is all one guiding ideology.

Because these collections are not a complete collection, that is, not a collection of all the writings and speeches of this period, we must be very careful about which articles were included in the Selected Works, and which were not included in the Selected Works. Because the tone of the "Resolution" is to criticize Mao Zedong's mistakes, and to affirm the efforts made by Liu, Zhou, Chen and Deng and others to correct these mistakes, in order to prove the "greatness" and "correctness" of the "Resolution", it will select articles according to this principle: That Mao Zedong's articles during this period clearly showed that  he "had become smug about their successes, was impatient for quick results and overestimated the role of man’s subjective will and efforts,...... So that high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and a 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the left-leaning error had seriously spread"; these will certainly be selected in the "collection."

 On the contrary, if the four people Liu, Zhou, Chen and Deng, during this period had opposed or corrected the " high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and a 'communist wind'", evidence of this would certainly be included in their Selected Works. During this period, if they clearly showed "smugness about their successes, impatience for quick results and overestimation of the role of man’s subjective will and efforts” as indications of left-leaning errors, such articles marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist winds' would not necessarily be selected.

There is a reasonable basis for this inference: Chen and Deng’s Selected Works were both selected by themselves and in terms of the issuing of the “Resolution”, they were number one and number two. Think about it.

From the three years from January 1958 to December 1960, Mao Zedong’s Selected Works included 69 articles, Liu Shaoqi’s included 1 article, Zhou Enlai’s included 3 articles, Chen Yun’s included 5 articles, and Deng Xiaoping’s included 2 articles. If you unwilling to just be a follower, you should find out these 80 articles, take a look at them, and compare them.　　

Third, which major leaders during the Great Leap Forward made "seriously spreading left-leaning mistakes "?

There are different views in recent years on whether the "Great Leap Forward" and the People's Commune movements are wrong, or whether they are error-oriented or achievement-oriented. I think that we should evaluate the achievements and problems during this period realistically, rather than denying them all. For the time being, however, we have identified them as mistakes, namely, that the "Great Leap Forward" movement and the rural people's commune movement had led to a serious proliferation of left-leaning errors marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist winds'.

So, who caused the high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and "communist wind"? Is it because, as officially said, “it was owing to comrade Mao Zedong, and many leading comrades from the central and local governments”? Let's turn over the works of the 1958-1960 period of the central leaders to see what they say to judge this.

 

(1)             What did Liu Shaoqi say?

 

Liu Shaoqi was the first leader of the central front line during the Great Leap Forward. The first of two volumes of Liu Shaoqi's Selected Works, compiled by the Central Documentation Research Office, contains important articles from May 1926 to September 1949. The next volume contains important articles from 1950 to June 1965, of which only one article, “China should have two education systems and two labor systems” was written during the Great Leap Forward period, on May 30, 1958.

This article is a speech at the expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, dedicated to the "half-time school education system and part-time labor system", not with the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward. Therefore, we cannot judge from Liu Shaoqi’s Selected Works whether Liu Shaoqi promoted or resisted the "high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the seriously spreading left-leaning error", we cannot determine how much responsibility he has for this.

But as the top leader on the front line, presiding over the day-to-day work of the Party Central Committee, he could not have spoken only once in three years. The reasonable explanation is that other speeches and articles from this period may have clearly shown that he "had become smug about their successes, was impatient for quick results and overestimated the role of man’s subjective will and efforts… So that high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and a 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the left-leaning error had seriously spread"; it is not a selection with evidence of opposing or correcting "high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist winds'".

 

(2) What did Zhou Enlai say?

 

"Zhou Enlai’s Selected s Works" has two volumes, the first volume contains the important articles from December 1926 - September 1949; the next volume contains important articles from December 1949 to 1975. Zhou’s Selected Works contains three articles from the period of the Great Leap Forward, Current Tasks of the Reform of the Chinese Language (10 January 1958), Pass on Knowledge and Experience to Future Generations (29 April 1959), and The Communist International and the Communist Party of China (14 and 15 July 1960).

The Current Tasks of the Reform of the Chinese Language, which was reported at the CPPCC National Committee, addressed three tasks of the current written language reform effort: simplifying Chinese characters, promoting Putonghua, and formulating and implementing a Chinese Pinyin program.

 

Pass on Knowledge and Experience to Future Generations, is a speech at the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, asking old comrades to draw on their surplus energies and capacity for work, and give leadership to more young people.

 

Communist International and the Communist Party of China, as part of a report at the Beidaihe Conference of the CPC Central Committee, reviewed the relationship between the Communist International and communist countries.

 

These three articles, too, are not only irrelevant to the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, but also to correcting the errors of the Great Leap Forward. Even if the "Communist International and the Communist Party of China" criticized the third "Left Opportunist" line, it also praised Chairman Mao. It proved that Chairman Mao was wise and great. Therefore, we cannot judge from the "Zhou Enlai’s Selected Works" whether Zhou was fanning the flames of the "high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and the 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the seriously spreading left-leaning error " or resisting it. We cannot determine how much responsibility he bears.

But as the head of the State Council, Premier Zhou, who had always worked diligently for the people, could not have made only three speeches in three years. The reasonable explanation is that other speeches and articles of his from this period may have clearly shown that he "had become smug about their successes, was impatient for quick results and overestimated the role of man’s subjective will and efforts…So that high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and a 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the left-leaning error had seriously spread"; it is not a selection with evidence of opposing or correcting "high indicators, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist winds'".

 

What did Deng Xiaoping say?

 

Some people believed that Deng Xiaoping was actually the second leader of the Central Committee during this period, and later on, it was actually a tie between "Liu and Deng". For example, when drawing up the iron and steel targets for 1959, Chen Yun, who ranked higher than Deng Xiaoping in the party, organised the Ministry of Metallurgy, the State Planning Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission to repeatedly study the views of the Finance and Economics Group, and then reported them to the Secretariat, which approved them before submitting them to the Politburo and Chairman Mao for discussion and approval.

 

There are no Complete Works of Deng Xiaoping. His important works are included in "Selected works of Deng Xiaoping", a total of three volumes, edited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Literature Editorial Committee, and publicly released in November 1993. The first volume contains important articles from 1938 to 1965, the second volume contains 12 articles from 1975 to 1982, and the third volume contains important works from 1982 to 1992. There were two of Deng's articles from the period of "Great Leap Forward", "To improve and popularise education " (April 7, 1958)[2], and "Correctly Disseminate Mao Zedong Thought" (March 25, 1960).

 

These two articles are not only irrelevant to the mistakes of the Great Leap Forward, but also to correcting the errors of the Great Leap Forward. Therefore, we cannot judge from the "Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping" whether he was fanning the flames of the "high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and the 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the seriously spreading left-leaning error" or resisting it. We cannot determine how much responsibility he bears.

 

However, since prior to its publication in 1993, Comrade Xiaoping had checked everything, and as the Number One behind the "Resolution", if Comrade Xiaoping had opposed or corrected the works of "high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist style'" during this period, they would certainly have been included in the selection. In other words, there was little resistance or correction to the "left-leaning mistakes marked by high indicators, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist wind'" by Comrade Xiaoping.

It is equally reasonable to infer that if Comrade Xiaoping had clearly demonstrated in his speeches and articles during this period "the growth of complacency in the face of victory, eagerness to achieve, and exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective efforts…So that high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness, and 'communist wind' as the main symbol of the seriously spreading left-leaning error", they certainly would not have been selected, otherwise they would be in contradiction with the tone of the "Resolution". Nor can we believe that the Secretariat Office, which is divided into party affairs, politics, economy and so on, has only two articles in three years. At the very least, when the 1959 steel index was set in 1958, the finance team reported to the Secretariat headed by General Secretary Deng. A reasonable explanation is that Comrade Xiaoping's articles and speeches resisting or correcting left-leaning errors are not available, while other speeches and articles that may  have clearly shown "complacency fostered in the face of victory, eagerness for success, exaggerating the role of subjective will and subjective efforts…making the left-leaning errors marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist wind' seriously proliferate", therefore cannot be selected.

(4) What did Chen Yun say?

 

Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Chen Yun was in charge of organization work for a long time. He was the sixth secretary of the CCP’s “Five Secretaries” and had a much higher status than Deng Xiaoping. The important documents of Chen Yun's life are included in "Chen Yun's Selected Works". It consists of three volumes[3], edited by the Research Office of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He has written 153 articles, including 5 articles during the "Great Leap Forward" period:

 

1. "Summing up experience is an important way to improve oneself" and "Several important issues to ensure the quality of capital construction projects" were respectively presented by Comrade Chen Yun at the National Capital Construction Project Quality Hangzhou Conference on December 23 and 26, 1958. The speech and summary pointed out that there were some quality problems in the capital construction in 1958, analyzed the reasons for these problems, and required that the capital construction must pay attention to the project quality, and proceed from the actual construction of the basic construction to grasp the design, materials, construction and other issues. It was relatively pragmatic. However, this is only a specific problem of project quality, and it has not yet risen to a national level of economic work.

2. In June 1958, the Central Committee decided to set up the Central Finance and Economics Group, of which Chen Yun was the head, and in April 1959 he wrote this letter to all the comrades of the Group, mainly on two aspects: " Recently I have come up with several ideas about the market and on planning methods."

" First, I shall talk about the issue of alleviating shortages in the market.

“1. We must consume and use grain economically… "

" 2. We must manage our supplies of pork, chicken, duck, eggs and fish…. "

" 3. We should make special arrangements for the production of daily necessities… "

" 4. We should reduce people's purchasing power and carefully cut down on the number of excess workers recruited last year… "

" 5. With regard to the transportation shortage, we should give top priority to providing the transportation necessary to bring goods to the market. In particular, we should make adequate arrangements for short distance transportation… "

" Next, I shall talk about the methods of drawing up the plan for 1960." There were two methodologies, i.e. in determining targets to strive for in industrial production next year, it should be done on the basis of both the production capacity of existing equipment and the production capacity that they could count on adding as a result of capital construction the following year. and not forgetting what other factors need to be considered.

There is no sense of urgency in this letter, but there is also not a single word to prevent it.

3. " The question of setting realistic targets for the production of iron and steel ". When people criticize the "Great Leap Forward", they generally focus on the 10,000 jin per mu production and the great iron and steel production. A lot of people say how the whole nation made iron and steel in 1958, but let's see what Chen Yun said in 1959.

On May 11, 1959, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee held a meeting at which Chen Yun made a lengthy speech on the issue of steel targets.

The first section was titled "The question of a reliable target for the production of rolled steel as well as a target to strive for ". Chen Yun believed that the target of 9 million tons of steel and 13 million tons of steel production for 1959 was relatively reliable, and that 15 million tons of steel production for the whole year was possible.

In terms of production organisation, Chen Yun was supportive of the clay method being put in place, " Washed coal is the key to improving the quality of iron and steel… To improve the quality of coke, the first step is to do a better job of washing the coal... The coal washing capacity is as follows. The large mechanized coal washing factories will produce about 19. 5 million tons of coal this year and the newly built factories (most are simple coal washing factories where the problem of equipment is being worked out) will produce 5.5 million tons of coal. These two produce a total of 25 million tons of coal. In addition, we shall also produce 20 million tons of coal using indigenous methods. " Foreign methods and local methods account for almost half each.

" It should be noted that the scale of construction (including mechanized coke ovens and simple coke ovens) in the coking industry is not small. However, only two-thirds of our needs will be met, even if we are able to finish building all of them on time and we make the most of the existing coking capacity. The remaining one-third, i.e. , 10 million tons of coke, must still come from production using indigenous techniques. Washed coal, of course, can also be processed into good coke, but we still need to perfect the coking techniques. We must give this matter adequate attention. "

"About refractory materials… Of these materials, only 20 per cent will be mined mechanically; the remaining 80 per cent will be produced mainly through manual techniques. Therefore, mining and transportation operations will require a great deal of manpower.” Chen Yun also said, "Even if the Political Bureau agrees to set the rolled steel production target at 9 million tons as a starting point and to set the steel target at 13 million tons, we would still request the Political Bureau to allow the Financial and Economic Group some time to consider the option of setting the steel production target at 15 million tons as proposed by comrades in the Ministry of Metallurgy..."

At the very least, Chen Yun was still very supportive of the local method of steel production[4] until May 1959, which actually shows that the local method of steel production did solve a lot of problems back then, far from what people think today, when they say that the local method is full of shortcomings, and that whoever advocates the local method is ultra-left, which is not the case at all.

 

China's actual steel production in 1959 was 11.22 million tons, failing to meet the target of 15 million tons that Chen Yun advocated, or the reliable target of 13 million tons, suggesting that the steel target for 1959 was indeed set too high.

 

However, from the whole speech, Chen Yun's calculation of the 13 million tons of steel production was thoroughly considered and carefully calculated, and he listened to six reports from the Ministry of Metallurgy, and also integrated the opinions of the Bureau of Heavy Industry Planning of the State Planning Commission and the Bureau of Metallurgy of the State Economic and Trade Commission, and the Financial and Economic Affairs Panel had studied it, and "Comrades Fuchun[5], Yibo[6] and Zhao Erlu[7]" were all in agreement. The Secretariat, of which Deng Xiaoping was the General Secretary, also met and discussed the matter, and then submitted it to the Politburo. It should be said that the procedure was very complete, and definitely not decided by someone's head as some publicists imagine today, let alone by Comrade Mao Zedong's single-mindedness and paternalism.

5. “Letter to Comrade Mao Zedong concerning the Iron and Steel Target”. After the Politburo discussed and agreed on the steel target for 1959, Comrade Chen Yun wrote a special letter to Chairman Mao on 15 May, 1959. The basic content was to adhere to the views expressed in the previous article, to the effect that the steel target of 9 million tonnes and the steel target of 13 million tonnes were considered too low by the Ministry of Metallurgy and there was disagreement. Chen Yun requested Chairman Mao, " I hope that the comrades in the Financial and Economic Group, including Comrade [Wang] Heshou[8], will report to you. Please brief us when you have the time."

From the above five articles, we can see that Comrade Chen Yun attached more importance to the quality of capital construction projects, and that the estimate of the steel target for 1959 was a bit higher than the actual. However, it cannot be concluded that Comrade Chen Yun resisted or corrected the left-leaning mistakes, but neither can it be asserted that he "fostered complacency in the face of victory, was eager for success, and exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective efforts", and that he was responsible for "the serious proliferation of left-leaning mistakes marked by high targets, arbitrariness, bosatfulness and the 'communist wind'", nor can it be proved that Chen Yun was not responsible, at least for "insufficient experience in socialist construction and insufficient understanding of the laws of economic development and the basic situation of the Chinese economy". It is also possible to judge from the year of publication of Chen Yun's Selected Works that if there were writings in this period by Chen Yun that opposed or corrected the "high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and 'communist wind'", they would certainly have been included in the anthology; and if there were writings in this period that showed a greater error than the overestimation of steel targets, they would not necessarily be included.

 

However, in the 1980s and 1990s, when the denial of Mao Zedong was rampant and the "Great Leap Forward" was totally rejected, Chen Yun still agreed to include the first two articles on steel targets in the Selected Works, which shows that Chen Yun was pragmatic. At the same time, it also struck me that Chen Yun's mistake might have been very minor compared to others at the time.[9]

 

(v) What did Mao Zedong say?

 

As we all know, 1958-1960 was a year of great events in China. During this period, the United States and Chiang colluded in a conspiracy drama, the Chinese People's Liberation Army shelled the Golden Gate (Jinmen) to stop Taiwan's independence plot; rebellion in Tibet; Sino-Indian War; break with the Soviet Union and so on. Economic construction was only part of Mao Zedong's considerations. So, what did Mao Zedong say during the Great Leap Forward? Let's go through Chairman Mao's writings.

 

Mao Zedong's Selected Works was released in five volumes, the first four of which contained important writings from the Chinese revolutionary period, from Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society on 1 December 1925 to The Bankruptcy of the Idealist View of History on 16 September 1949. The fifth volume, which is no longer in circulation, contains only an excerpt from Chairman Mao's speech at a meeting of representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow on 18 November 1957, All reactionaries are paper tigers. We do not see any important writings from 1958 and onwards in Mao's Selected Works, but the eight volumes of Mao Zedong's Collected Works, edited by the Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in June 1999, fill this gap, with volumes seven and eight spanning the period from January 1956 to July 1975.[10] These two volumes contain 69 articles, speeches, letters and instructions by Mao Zedong from 1958 to 1960, of which 29 are economic or deal with economic work. Once again, we repeat the inference: according to the tone of the Resolution, if Chairman Mao's writings were clearly "left-leaning" during this period, they would have been included, otherwise how could they echo the Resolution?

 

Through repeated study of the writings of Mao Zedong's Collected Works during the Great Leap Forward, I have not found a single word in them that shows that the old man[11] "fostered complacency in the face of victory and exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective effort" during the Great Leap Forward. On the contrary, every article is thoroughly rational, and from the very beginning he raised doubts about high targets, and from 1958 onwards he began to correct arbitrariness, boastfulness and the "communist wind".

 

In January 1958, Chairman Mao personally drafted 60 Points on Working Methods (Draft), in which he requested that "Before September this year, the question of my retirement from the Chairmanship of the People's Republic of China should be raised... first among cadres at of all grades, and then in factories in an attempt to sound out the views of both the cadres and the masses and to arrive at a majority agreement to it. My retirement from the Chairmanship of the Republic and concentration on the duties of the Chairman of the Party Central Committee will save me a great deal of time in order to meet the demands of the Party…Please explain all of this clearly to cadres and the masses as to avoid misunderstandings." He wished to do less practical work and more theoretical research. It is clear from this that Chairman Mao was somewhat optimistic at the time. But this optimism was definitely not one of complacency or eagerness for success, but of trust in his comrades. Perhaps, in the face of the great economic situation, the old man felt that he could settle down to do something he liked, such as inspecting the Yellow River and studying philosophy. However, soon after he retired to the second line, the mistake of what people today call eagerness for success "proliferated" in the economic field and in the People's Commune movement.

 

The following are some of Chairman Mao's writings on economic work during this period. Let's see if the old man "fostered complacency in the face of victory, was eager for success, exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective efforts, and ...... made the left-leaning errors, mainly marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and the 'communist wind', spread seriously":

 

1. "On the Problem of Socialist Commodity Production". Between 2-10 November 1958, Chairman Mao summoned some central leaders and some local leaders to a working conference in Zhengzhou. In his many speeches at the conference, he criticised the eagerness to make the transition from collective to universal ownership and from socialism to communism in the people's communes, as well as such erroneous claims as the attempt to abolish commodity production. Mao Zedong's speeches on the issue of socialist commodity production are included in the collection under the title 'On the Issue of Socialist Commodity Production'. Throughout this article there is a strong advocacy of vigorous development of commodity production, encouragement of commodity exchange and opposition to haste. For example, "Many people avoid talking about commodities and commerce as if it would not be communism if it were so." "Promote truthfulness, don't lie and don't report other people's pigs as your own. ...... The People's Daily had better be cool down. Make it a priority to address the issue of working methods, party leadership, the mass line and seeking truth from facts." We should take solving the problem of working methods as the key point, the leadership of the Party, the mass line and the truth-seeking. "There is a bias now, as if the sooner communism is achieved the better. There are steps to be taken to achieve communism. Fan County in Shandong proposes to achieve communism in two years, so send someone to investigate. Now some people always want to make communism in three or five years." "Now our economists ...... disapprove of commodity production and think that the Soviet Union is already communist, when in fact it is still far from it. If we have been socialist for only a few years, we are even further off." "Now, some of our people have a great tendency to want to eliminate commodity production. They aspire to communism and fret at the mention of commodity production, thinking it is a capitalist thing, failing to distinguish between socialist and capitalist commodity production and not understanding the importance of the role of using commodity production under socialist conditions."

Over the years, some people have said that Chairman Mao only advocated food production and opposed commodity production, which is pure nonsense. In fact, as early as 14 June 1956, Chairman Mao's instructions to "all provincial, municipal and autonomous regional party committees" in a report by Tan Zhenlin and others called for "agricultural production cooperatives to pay attention to diversified business operations".

2."Journalists should be cool-headed". "I am sympathetic to concealing production," Chairman Mao said in a conversation with Wu Lengxi, president of the Xinhua News Agency and editor-in-chief of the People's Daily, on 21 November 1958. "There is nothing wrong with concealing production, except for the fact that it is dishonest. If the production is concealed, the grain is still there. The idea of concealing production has to be criticised, but it is not seriously bad for developing production." "Misreporting is not good, it is more dangerous than concealing production. If you over-report, you can't take it out. If you make a production plan based on over-reported figures, there is danger, making a supply plan, even more danger."

The concealment of production and the misrepresentation of production are both mistakes, but they are different in nature. As for the concealment of production, Chairman Mao was sympathetic, showing that he was thinking from the perspective of the peasants. The attitude of other leaders towards concealment and misrepresentation is not found in their writings. Were they not aware of these problems or is there something inconvenient about it today?

Comrade Wu Lengxi published his memoirs "Remembering Chairman Mao" in 1987. Chapter 7 recalls the conversation Chairman Mao had with him in October 1958, asking the Xinhua News Agency and the People's Daily to be cautious in reporting high targets and boastfulness, and to be "a promoter of calm ". Chapter 8, "Seeking truth from facts", recalls the many summonses in November 1958, including this one, and the following is a paragraph from Comrade Wu Lengxi's memoirs about the conversation he had with him the next day, 22 November, which is entitled "Hot-headedness" and is reproduced below It reads as follows.

"In the evening of the next day (22 November), Chairman Mao sent Tian Jiaying and me to talk, mainly about the need for modesty[12] and to seek truth from facts in propaganda. He reminded me in particular that those who run newspapers and are journalists should analyse everything and adopt the correct attitude of seeking truth from facts.

 

"Chairman Mao's talk started from the afternoon of that day (22 November) when he spoke to the heads of the major collaboration groups. It seems that Chairman Mao was very touched by the afternoon meeting and was still in a state of exuberance when he spoke to us. Chairman Mao had wanted to discuss with the group leaders of the major regions the reduction of the production target for 1959, starting with the steel target. The original target had been set at the Beidaihe meeting in August 1958. Chairman Mao envisaged the possibility of reducing the steel production target from 30 million to 18 million tonnes. He originally wanted to persuade them, but instead it was the group leaders who tried to persuade Chairman Mao to maintain the original target. Chairman Mao said, "They all tried to get through to me, but I couldn't figure it out because they lacked a basis. Some of their regions wanted to increase steel production by twice next year, some provinces wanted to increase it by four times, some wanted to increase it by more than ten times, and some even wanted to increase it by thirty times. How can this be believed?”

 

"Chairman Mao also said that 12 ministers from the central government had already written reports with frighteningly high targets, as if to set military orders. But I don't think we should do our heads in even if we don't finish it. The Minister of Railways said that 20,000 kilometres of railways were to be built in 1959. The second five-year plan drafted under the auspices of Premier Zhou stipulated that 20,000 kilometres would be built in five years, but he boasted that it would be completed in one year. How can this be? If it is really completed, I am willing to be an opportunist.

 

"Chairman Mao also said that in fact the target of 18 million tons of steel was not opportunistic, and it was still a question whether it could be fulfilled, because of the 10 million tons of steel production expected to be made this year (1958), only 8.5 million tons of good steel was produced, and it seemed that the few days of reading at the Zhengzhou meeting did not solve the ideological problems, and people were still hot-headed. The doubling of steel in 1958 caused 60 million people to go to the mountains, causing chaos in the world. Next year, how can we double or even multiply it again?

 

“Chairman Mao said that there should be more modesty. There is still so much arrogance in the air, it has only compressed a bit, not substantially, we should be firmer and less flabby. I see the task next year is further reductions, this way for industry and this way for agriculture. Last winter and this spring we repaired 50 billion cubic meters of water conservancy projects, this winter and next spring we should not do another 50 billion cubic meters of earth, we should reduce it.

 

"Speaking of this, Chairman Mao explained that he had come to us in order to quickly tell the reporters and editors of the People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency about the spirit of modesty. He said that the air of arrogance should now be cut back on in propaganda, that we should stop drumming up false energy, that we should drum up real energy, that we should not get hot-headed ourselves, and that we should not encourage people to get hot-headed."

 

Now can we see how Chairman Mao "fostered complacency in the face of victory, rushed for success, and exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective effort"?

 

3. Speech at the Wuchang Conference. On 23 November 1958 Mao Zedong said:

"Comrades from the 12 central ministries wrote twelve reports… The proposed targets and their basis should be studied effectively. Some of the targets presented in the report are inadequate, impossible and unfounded, and ministries need to supplement them. For example, it is not sufficient to say why it is possible to reach 400 million tons of steel in a decade.”

 

"Reports always need to be well-founded. It needs to be made clearer and state when it can be passed. For example, when exactly will the two heads of equipment for steel - mining and rolling - be ready to pass when they have not passed? Is it next March, April or May? Why will they be ready by then? Give reasons and justifications. Another example is why the machinery is not matched, when will it be matched what is the basis for that?" It is a common sense to have a basis for writing a report. Today, if a section chief showed a report to the director with no basis, the director would definitely throw it out. However, the twelve reports of the twelve ministries seen by the Chairman of the Party Central Committee back then did not even have a basis.

 

4. “The issue of forgery. The first draft of the ‘Resolution on some issues of the people's commune’, which was put forward at the Zhengzhou meeting, is now to be made into a directive, and the issue of forgery is to be dedicated to one article, not to be written together with the working methods, otherwise people will not pay attention. Now we have to put up 'satellites' and fight for reputation, so we create falsifications. One commune, which had only 100 pigs of its own, borrowed 200 large pigs in order to cope with the visit, and sent them back after the visit. If you have a hundred heads, you have a hundred heads, if you don't, you don't. What's the point of being fake? ...... hearts and minds are not in unison, I think it is still a bit false, some people in the world are not so honest. I recommend that you talk practically with the secretary of the county party committee and the secretary of the commune party committee, be honest and don't create falsehoods."

 

Then the Old Man said that the pace of literacy, greening and the elimination of the four pests was simply unbelievable. "The tasks set from above he always said were either completed or falsified if they were not. The serious problem now is that not only is it falsified from below, but we believe it, from the central, provincial and local levels to the counties, mainly the first three levels, which is dangerous...I believe that falsification is also a product of mistakes. For example, eleven million tons of steel, ... is it really that much? Another example is grain, how much is there, last year there was three hundred and seventy billion jin, this year they first said nine hundred billion jin, and later reduced it to seven hundred and fifty billion to eight hundred billion jin, is this reliable?" The author of this paragraph has three points to make: First, from the bottom up, the falsification is very serious; Second, some people in the central government believe these falsifications, who they are, he did not know, anyway, Chairman Mao does not believe it; Third, the Old Man does not believe the 1958 steel production of 11 million tons.

 

"Compare things, and if the results are falsified, there will be no comparison, and then no competition. We need to set up a competition, we need to test things, we need to organize an acceptance committee, like the export of materials, it doesn't fit the specifications, it won’t be exported. The more detailed the economic undertaking is, the more practical and scientific it is, is not the same as doing poetry. We need to know the difference between poems and economic undertakings. ‘Scoop up Lake Chao[13] in a ladle’.  This is a poem, which I have never written, but probably you people in Anhui have.

 

How can Lake Chao be scooped up in a ladle? Even if you’ve checked it, you would still have to estimate that there is something false in it. There are some falsifications that you can't find out even if you do check them out, people have held meetings and set them up beforehand. I hope that the central, provincial and local levels all understand this problem, have a clear head and discount things.

 

Is it possible to have a 30/70 split, with three out of ten being fake? Is this an underestimation of achievements and distrust of cadres and the public? To have a part not trusted, to estimate that at least not less than 10% are false, and some are 100% false. This is bad falsification. Another kind of falsehood, also well-made, is to deal with subjectivism, forced orders.  Another kind of falsification is worthy of delight. For example, there is a contradiction between concealing production, where the cadres want to report more and where the people want to conceal production. There are advantages to concealing production, if some places report more, then the top will transfer away more, leaving that place with little, so it is taking a loss.

 

There is another kind of falsification, which is also well-made, and is to deal with subjectivism and forced orders. A devolved cadre in Zhongnanhai wrote back to say that the commune where he was working had stipulated that three hundred mu of bao cereals should be uprooted and replaced by sweet potatoes, and that one and a half million sweet potatoes should be planted per mu, while the bao cereals had already grown as high as a man's head at that time, and the masses felt sorry that only thirty mu had been uprooted, but it was reported that three hundred mu had been uprooted. This kind of falsification is good.

 

Wang Renzhong said that in one of his hometowns in Hebei, during the Spring Festival, people were asked to water wheat and were not allowed to rest, so what could the people do but to fake it. Lanterns were lit in the fields at night, and people actually rested at home; the cadres saw lights everywhere and thought that people had not rested. There was a county in Hubei that wanted the masses to fight hard day and night and not to sleep at night. But when the masses wanted to sleep, they sent small children on sentry duty, and when they saw the cadres coming, they got up and coaxed and cajoled, and when the cadres left, they went back to sleep. This is also good fakery.

 

In short, one needs the cadres to have a clear head, and one needs to educate them not to be deceived and not to force orders. Otherwise, what if people get up and go on sentry duty? Now there is a kind of air, to only talk about achievements, not shortcomings. There are shortcomings in front of people, but no one listens to the truth, they falsify, talk more, and there is glory in that.

 

No one listens when you talk about a cow's tail growing on the back of your arse, but when you talk about it growing on your head, it's news. It is important to educate, to speak clearly, to be honest, and to be able to do it within a few years. I can see that after a number of years, when it is on track, it can be more down-to-earth."

 

From this paragraph, it is clear that Chairman Mao's heart was linked to the masses, and he was supportive of the masses' resistance to the "falsification" ordered by their superiors, but the bureaucratic class was their antagonist, which may help us to understand the Old Man's launching of the Cultural Revolution.

 

4. “A Lesson”. On 25 November 1958, Chairman Mao gave a lengthy instruction on the CPC Yunnan Provincial Committee's inspection report of 18 November 1958 to the Central Committee on the situation of the swollen sick and the dead, in which he said: "When a thousand burdens came down on them, the county and township cadres had no choice but to work hard, and if they did less, they were called 'right-leaning ', leading people's minds to one-sidedness, caring about production and forgetting about life. The solution: (a) don't impose tasks too heavily, don't exceed the possible burden of the masses' energy, leave some room for the masses; (b) grasp production and livelihood at the same time, walk on two legs, don't be one-sided." Obviously, he was opposed to the provincial committee giving the county and township targets that were too high, reminding them not to give tasks beyond the affordability of the masses, while paying attention to improving people's lives. Where is the slightest hint of complacency or eagerness for success? On the contrary, he was criticising them for setting the targets too high and "pressing down a thousand heavy burdens".

 

5. Intra-Party Correspondence, 15 March 1959. During this period Chairman Mao had three pieces of "Intra-Party Correspondence"[14] that went beyond the central office and appealed to cadres at levels lower down. What exactly caused Chairman Mao to do this? It is not clear, but it is conceivable that the Old Man was simply unable to get his voice across in accordance with his working channels.

 

The first one[15], "Intra-Party Correspondence " dated 15 March 1959, was addressed to the first secretaries of the Party committees of the provinces, cities and districts. In response to the "communist style" of making communes and even counties the basic accounting unit, Chairman Mao demanded that small teams be made the basic accounting unit. Perhaps there was a difference of opinion in the Central Committee on this issue, and perhaps others thought he was too slow to enter communism, so he had to ask to hear the views of the masses. "I feel that this question has very important bearings…We must have the earnest approval from the basic units’ cadres…" For the decision already made by Henan "the comrades of the provincial party committee are still asked to solicit the views of basic-level cadres at the counties’ conference of cadres from four levels of cadres which is being held currently. If they agree with the decision of the provincial party committee, then implement it accordingly. Otherwise, it may be helpful to make some changes." "In short, work must be done in accordance with the wishes of the masses. No matter what the method is, it will be workable only if it meets with the requirements of the masses. Otherwise, it will not work in the long run." It ends with the words, "Please reflect and decide on what you will do."

 

6. “Intra-Party Communications”, 17 March 1959[16]. This article is also written to the first secretaries of the provincial, municipal and district party committees, to discuss "a matter concerning the conferences to be held by the counties and communes", and asks that the views of the masses must be fully listened to everywhere, that the views of all parties must be fully listened to, and that "they will be integrated with the masses". "Our comrades of the commune party committees must constantly concern themselves with the interests of the masses. They must always bear in mind that their own policies and measures must be in accord with the current level of consciousness of the masses and with their immediate and pressing needs. Anything that goes counter to these two conditions will not do and will invariably fail". “The above is presented only a suggestion. Please think it over and decide on how to handle it…”

 

These two communications above are exploratory in tone throughout, without the slightest hint of pride or arbitrariness in any of them. When discussing specific methods of work, he was as patient as a teacher teaching his pupils to write by hand, even urging that "when the county meets, people should be left at all levels of the commune to lead the production, or alternatively to attend the meetings, so as not to miss the farming time." It can be inferred from this how high the "heat" was at the time, and the party chairman had to throw cold water on it to cool it down.

 

7. “Intra-Party Communications” of 29 April 1959. This third intra-party correspondence was addressed to cadres at the six levels of "provincial, prefectural, county, community, squad and squad". It is not known whether writing directly to squad-level cadres was a reaction to his helplessness in correcting left-leaning errors. In his correspondence he "discusses several issues with comrades, all of which are about agriculture”. There are six issues in all.

 

"The first question concerns the fixing of production targets. Rice transplanting is being carried out in the south and the north is also engaged in spring cultivation. Fixing production targets must be based on realities. Just do not pay any attention to those stipulations made in the instructions from higher levels. Ignore them and simply concentrate on practical possibilities. For instance, if production per mu was actually only 300 catties last year, it will be very good indeed if production could be increased by 100 or 200 catties. Elevating it up to 800, 1,000 or 1,200 catties and even more is mere bragging and cannot be achieved at all. So what is the use in exaggerating? Again, for example, the achievement will be very great indeed if an increase of 200 or 300 catties can be achieved this year from land producing 500 catties per mou last year. To increase further, generally speaking, is impossible."

Thirty years ago, when I was in secondary school, my political science teacher told me how many thousands of jin per mu were produced during the Great Leap Forward and that was because Chairman Mao came from a peasant background and actually believed in ten thousand jin per mu. At that time, I did not believe that Chairman Mao was so confused, but I was also very confused. Now I understand that the old man did not even believe in the 800 jin per mu yield, how could he believe in the 10,000 jin per mu yield? If the whole Party, and even other key leaders of the Party, had been as calm as he was, the subsequent famine might have been much better. Here, Chairman Mao encourage subordinates to "ignore them (the targets set by their superiors)" and "simply concentrate on practical possibilities”. Perhaps, as high targets were passed all the way from the central government to the provinces and counties, Chairman Mao was so helpless that he had to call on the grassroots to fight against the high targets.

"The second question concerns close planting. It should not be too thinly spread out, nor planted too closely.” Many people claimed that “the closer the planting, the better it will be. This is incorrect… Since production targets are to be fixed, the question of close planting should be discussed and determined by production teams and production groups. Rigid orders from above regarding the closeness to be maintained are not only useless, but also very harmful. Therefore, we should completely refrain from issuing such rigid orders to those in the lower levels. "

I remember reading articles criticising the unlimited close planting during the "Great Leap Forward". This shows that the mistake of close planting cannot be put on Chairman Mao's head. Chairman Mao was so firm in his opposition: some "doggedly called for close planting only. Some even claimed that the closer the planting, the better it will be. This is incorrect." "We should completely refrain from issuing such rigid orders." Who advocated "the closer the better"? I don't know, but it must be the top leaders, and there are not many of them.

"The third question concerns economizing on food grains." " There must be reserve grains. Set aside a little each year and increase reserve grains year by year. After eight or 10 years of struggle, the problem of food production will be solved. In 10 years, there should be no boasting or exaggerating; to do so will be highly dangerous. Keep in mind that ours is a big country with a population of 650 million and eating is a matter of great importance. ""Set aside a little each year", "After eight or ten years of struggle", can you say that this is a rush to success? If this had been the consensus within the party, there would have been much less starvation later.

" The sixth question concerns candor. State exactly what production targets can be achieved. When you have exerted all efforts but failed to achieve something, do not force yourself to make false claims of success. State exactly how much you have harvested and refrain from making false statements, which are contrary to facts… There are a lot of falsehoods that are pressed out of it. Above 'one blow two pressure three wishes', making it difficult to do below. Therefore, the drive must have, falsehoods must not be s People who are fond of making false statements are firstly hurting the people and secondly, themselves. It should be said that many of these false statements were the result of pressure from above." Telling the truth was not a problem, but the Chairman of the Party Central Committee's painstaking emphasis on truth-telling shows how serious the "boastfulness" was at the time.

At the end of the communication, the Old Man said, " In comparison with the high-sounding talks currently making the rounds what I am saying here is very much low-keyed. The objective is to stir up activism and achieve the target of increased production. If it (production) is not actually as low as I make it out to be and it has achieved a relatively higher target, I will then become a conservative. Thank heavens, if that is so. It will be a great honor indeed. "

It would be best if I were wrong, his tone of voice reveals a sense of helplessness and anxiety. Subsequent facts proved the Old Man right, proved that his fears were not superfluous, and proved that he was not a conservative but a model of pragmatism. As General Zhu[17] was rumoured to have said, "Every time people opposed him (Chairman Mao), they were proven wrong afterwards every time and he was right". This was true during the revolutionary era and it is still true during the period of socialist construction. Who was singing the high-sounding tune all the time, leading to the problems that followed, is a very complex issue and I dare not jump to conclusions. But what is certain is that Chairman Mao was definitely not the one who sang the high-sounding tune.

8. “Speech at the Zhengzhou Conference (1)” On 27 February 1959, Chairman Mao repeatedly stressed that people's communes should have a process of development and that the ownership of production teams should not be eliminated as soon as a people's commune was established, and criticised the "communist wind". This was in line with his advocacy of using the production team as the basic accounting unit and his opposition to "one big, two publics"[18] and "one flat, two transfers"[19]. Subsequently, he also personally drafted the Minutes of the Zhengzhou Conference, which "set out" "fourteen sentences as the current guidelines for rectifying and building people's communes." I don't know of any of the more than 2,000 county governors in the country today who still personally draft the minutes of their meetings.

 

The second volume of the Party's history is full of nonsense about the people's commune being fully responsible for both this and that, and that "the production brigade was responsible for production management and part of the economic accounting, while the production team was only a basic unit for organizing production in a concrete way."[20]  In a vain attempt to put the "one big, two public" hat on Chairman Mao. But having read Chairman Mao's books, we realise that Chairman Mao always insisted on the production team as the basic accounting unit. Who on earth had been resisting Chairman Mao's demand for a smaller accounting unit and insisting on "one big, two publics"? And who had the power to do so?

 

9. "The Law of Values is a Great School"[21], a criticism written by Mao on 30 March 1959 on the report of 29 March 1959 by Tao Luqie, the first secretary of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee, on the situation of the five-level cadre conference in the counties of Shanxi Province, criticised the "communist wind" as "money from robbery”. To describe the "communist wind" as "robbing money" means that whoever blows the "communist wind" is a robber. This shows how much the Old Man hated the "communist wind".

 

10. “Economic Construction is a Science, to be Studied Honestly" In a talk with a group of Peruvian parliamentarians on 11 June 1959, he said, "We are now putting forward the slogan 'greater, faster, better and more economical' for building the economy and culture. It can be faster, but it cannot be very fast; to think that it will be very fast is bragging; you will not believe it, and neither do I." It is evident that Chairman Mao pressed for no hasty thinking.

 

11. “The Grain Question”. This was a lengthy endorsement written during the Lushan Politburo meeting on 5 July 1959 for the issuance of Deputy Minister of Food Chen Guodong's 4 July Report on the Opinions on the Adjustment of the Grain Distribution and Grain Income and Expenditure Plan for 1959-1960. One of the sentences was: "Restore private vegetable gardens and be sure to allow private plots." I used to hear about cutting off the tails of capitalism and only growing grain without private plots, something that certainly had nothing to do with Chairman Mao.

 

12. “A Talk on Reading the Soviet Textbook of Political Economy (excerpt)”. From the winter of 1959 to the spring of 1960, Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai organised reading groups respectively. The reading group organised by Mao Zedong included Chen Boda, Hu Jie, Deng Liqun and Tian Jiaying. From 10 December 1959 to 9 February 1960, this reading group read through the Textbook of Political Economy compiled by the Institute of Economics of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Hangzhou, Shanghai and Guangzhou, adopting the method of reading and discussing at the same time, and Chairman Mao made a number of statements.

The article included in Selected Works Vol 8 is part of Chairman Mao's talks, in which he gives a systematic and comprehensive account of all aspects of socialist construction in China, all of which are of guidance to the construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics today. The article is very long and we recommend that our friends read it. For example, it says that "the stage of socialism may be divided into two stages, the first being underdeveloped socialism and the second being more developed socialism." This sounds familiar to us, the primary stage of socialism. Another example is "'Each 'country' has its own particular and specific form and method of socialist construction', is a good formulation", isn't this the theory of characteristics?

 

13. "Resolutely stop the "communist wind" and other violations of law and discipline". On 23 March 1960, after reading the second issue of the Conference report, which was compiled and printed by the secretariat of the Sixth Level Cadres' Conference in Shandong Province, Chairman Mao wrote a lengthy instruction to "the Party committees of all provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, as well as the ministries and commissions and Party groups at the central level" in response to the resurgence of the "communist wind" and boastfulness at that time. "The problems found in Shandong are certainly found in all provinces, cities and autonomous regions, but they are more or less the same.” “The problem is serious and they can’t handle it. In some counties and societies, the Zhengzhou resolution of last March was forgotten, as were the provisions of the 18 issues of the Shanghai meeting last April, and the 'communist wind', the boastfulness wind and the wind of giving orders were all blowing up again…" The Chairman of the Party Central Committee has failed to stop the "communist wind" five times and boastfulness three times. Compare the tone of Chairman Mao's correction of boastfulness and the "communist wind" from 1958 onwards. At first it was done in a consultative tone, then he became more and more severe, and in the spring of 1960 was even more severe.  In fact, Chairman Mao was always been democratic and not willing to adopt a paternalistic style of arbitrary orders, and it is not difficult to draw this conclusion from the comparison of attitudes towards wind correction in these years. As for the tone of "can’t handle it" from the spring of 1960, it was definitely not arbitrary.

 

14. “Opposing bureaucracy and overcoming ‘five more and five less’”. Chairman Mao drafted an internal Party directive for the CPC Central Committee on 30 March 1960, stating that the negative aspects at that time were "prominently manifested in the 'five more and five less'": "More meetings, less contact with the masses; more documents and forms, less summing up of experience; more people squatting in offices, less serious investigation and research; more business, less study; more general calls, less meticulous organisation of work." "With regard to the Centre, we will take up the issue. It seems that we have to talk about this 'five more and five less' problem twice a year, at least once. The Central Committee issued instructions on this issue a few years ago and then did not bother with it again (mainly referring to the 'five more' of more meetings and more documents and forms) and has its own bureaucracy, which cannot be blamed only on others. This article, and the accompanying article, should have appeared in the party journal." It is clear from this document that the "Central Committee" did not bother about the instructions given a few years ago to "overcome the 'five more and five less'", and that "they themselves have bureaucracy and it cannot be blamed only on others".

 

15. "Completely Correct the Five Winds", a directive issued on 15 November 1960 to all Central Bureaux, provincial, municipal and autonomous regional Party committees, called for the thorough correction of the "five winds" and that "within a few months we must resolve to thoroughly correct the very wrong 'communist wind', the boastful wind, the commandist wind, the special wind of cadres and the wind of blind command over production, and with the correction of the 'communist wind' as the focus, drive the correction of the other four crooked winds." By the end of 1960, the "five winds" were still very serious. Chairman Mao's tone regarding the correction of the wind became increasingly harsh, but this was not "arbitrary" as the ambitious would say, but an "anxious" one.

 

This instruction contains the following paragraph: "As long as the situation is clear, the determination is strong, the method is right, and the cadres are allowed to really learn and understand the policy (i.e. the twelve articles) according to the twelve instructions of the Central Committee, and the policy is given to the masses, the situation can be turned around in a few months' time, as evidenced by the experience in Hubei." The central instructions referred to here is the urgent letter of instruction from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China dated 3 November 1960 on the current policy issues of the rural people's communes.

 

There are twelve articles in total: 1. Three-tier ownership and team-based ownership are the fundamental system of the people's commune at this stage. 2. Resolutely oppose and thoroughly correct the error of one level and two transfers. 3. Strengthen the basic ownership system of the production teams. 4. Insist on the small ownership system of the production teams. 5. Allow community members to operate a small amount of private land and small-scale family sideline businesses. 6. Deduct more points for less, and try to achieve an increase in income for 90 per cent of the members. 7. Insist on the principle of each member doing his or her best and distributing the money according to his or her work, with a 30:70 split between the supply portion and the wage portion. 8. Conserve labour from all sides and strengthen the front line of agricultural production. 9. Arrange for good food and run public canteens. 10. Restore rural fairs in a led and planned manner to enliven the rural economy. 11. Seriously implement a combination of work and rest. 12: Let go of the masses and reorganise the society.

 

This letter of instruction from the Central Committee to correct the "five winds", including the boastful wind and the "communist wind", may not have been drafted by Chairman Mao, and I base this on the fact that it was not included in the Collected Works of Mao Zedong, but it was certainly not drafted under the auspices of Liu, Zhou, Chen and Deng, otherwise it would have been included in their collected works. I reckon it must have been drafted under the auspices of Chairman Mao, because not only was he supervising the implementation of the Twelve Articles, but they were also in line with his attitude towards the Five Winds in the past few years.

 

Then, on 28 November, he issued a letter of instruction to all Central Bureaux, provincial, municipal and district Party committees, "Never allow the one flat and two transfers". This shows how urgent the old man was to correct the "five winds".

 

16. “Resolutely refund the compensation and stop the ‘communist wind’.  Chairman Mao made a lengthy interjection during a briefing at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 30 December 1960, part of which was included in the collection under the title "Resolutely Refunding Compensation, Stopping the "Communist Wind"". He pointed out that "the fruits of peasant labour are even more exploited than those of landlords and capitalists" and that " we must resolutely refund the losses ". He said that the commune had taken a lot of things from the peasants because it had "started with 'black hands'". “The most common and harmful of the five winds is the 'communist wind' and the wind of blind command. The first thing to do is to get rid of them. It is necessary to find out exactly which are the winds of blind command of production, otherwise they will become commandless and planless." "In 1960, the natural disaster was even greater and a man-made disaster came. This man-made disaster is not caused by the enemy, but by ourselves. This year, the one level two transfers is more severe than in 1958, which lasted only four or five months, but this year it is a whole year. The enemy's sabotage has also increased, the big office is not working, and the 'communist wind' is blowing hard." "There are several lessons: First, the 'communist wind' must be opposed, and we must not plunder the peasants, which is forbidden by Marxism-Leninism. Second, several large offices again blew the 'communist wind', one said the old wind accounted for more, one said the new wind accounted for more, no matter which one is more, in short, it's a big mess, it seems that only medium and small offices can cope. Third, a large number of laborers were taken out, and tens of millions were transferred to industries above the county level. These three lessons are the main ones. These lessons must be acknowledged, or else they will not be changed. How can the 26 million people who have been added to the workforce not go back? It will be difficult to suppress it, but it must be suppressed."

 

Since 1958, Chairman Mao had been correcting the mistakes of boastfulness, the "communist wind" and blind command. However, by the end of 1960, the "five winds" were still very serious. By this time, the country was already in a very difficult situation. Who then repeated the mistakes of 1958 over and over again? According to the “Resolution”, who was "seriously spreading" the "left-leaning mistakes mainly marked by high targets, arbitrariness, bastfulness and the 'communist wind'"? I do not have an answer to this question. However, we can say with certainty that it was definitely not Chairman Mao who was "seriously spreading" the "left-leaning mistakes marked mainly by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and the 'communist wind'". We can see that by the end of 1960, Chairman Mao's tone of correcting the wind was already very severe. Is this called arbitrariness?

 

17. “The Right to Take Initiative Comes from Seeking Truth from Facts”. Chairman Mao was always brave enough to take responsibility for mistakes in the work of the Central Committee, including those which he had been correcting, and never shirked his responsibility. During the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held from 14 to 18 June 1960, Chairman Mao wrote "A Summary of the Decade", part of which, "The Right to Take the Initiative Comes from Seeking Truth from Facts", was included in the collection. "I have made many mistakes myself. Some of them were made together with the parties concerned. For example, at Beidaihe[22] I agreed that 30 million tons of steel could be completed in 1959; in December I agreed at Wuchang[23] that 20 million tons could be completed, and again at the Shanghai Conference[24] that 165 million tons could be completed. For example, at the Second Zhengzhou Conference in March 1959, it was argued that the accounts on the issue of one level and two transfers could not be settled; it was only in April, inspired by the comrades from Zhejiang and Hubei, that it was firmly argued that the accounts must be settled."

 

He did not hesitate to take up the responsibility of completing the 16.5 million tons of steel in 1959, which had been studied by so many departments and discussed by so many decision-making bodies. If Chairman Mao had to take any responsibility for the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune Movement, it was at most a little leadership responsibility, and those who were in charge of economic work at the front line, or those who directly drew up economic plans, should take the main responsibility.

 

Over the years, "Great Leap Forward" style of thinking has prevailed in various fields, for example, CCTV has been promoting the idea of luxury and corruption, advocating for the US and Europe to oppress the third world people, the national statistical system has been misrepresenting figures at all levels, black mines and tofu-dreg projects[25] abound, the Chinese people have been used as guinea pigs for genetic modification experiments, the two housing bonds of US$376 billion have gone down the drain without a sound, all these have led to increasingly sharp social conflicts, and no leader has ever admitted his mistakes.

 

According to the Global Times, when Fannie and Freddie went bankrupt, China lost $376 billion, equivalent to four or five years of military spending. In 2011, only 20 of the world's 190 countries had annual gross domestic product of more than $376 billion, and none of the G20 countries, such as South Africa or Argentina, reached $376 billion. Who explained this to the Chinese people? In the summer of 2011, the Foreign Affairs Bureau actually claimed that these foreign exchange reserves had nothing to do with the Chinese people, saying in a roundabout way that debits, credits, assets, liabilities, which fucking side is also a loss, how can it have nothing to do with the Chinese people? I don't know what the big leaders think, but they probably have the same attitude, or else they don't say a word about it like nobody's business! That's a long way off.

 

In addition, Chairman Mao's writings of this period abound with texts calling for a small stockpile of food. If cadres at all levels had really stocked up on grain as Chairman Mao had requested, the famine that followed might have been much less severe, and might not even have killed people. There are also articles that have nothing to do with economic issues that prove that Chairman Mao was not complacent at all during the Great Leap Forward, for example, when he spoke with representatives of the Cameroon People's Union and youth representatives from Guinea, Kenya and Madagascar on 21 February 1959, he sagely admonished: "The task of the whole of Africa as a whole is to oppose imperialism and those who follow it, not to oppose capitalism and not to build socialism. Anyone proposing to establish socialism would be making a mistake....... The nature of such revolutions in Africa at present is that of a bourgeois democratic revolution, not a proletarian socialist revolution. Generally speaking, the struggle throughout Africa is still a protracted one. One should not think that victory can be won immediately, overnight; one should prepare for a protracted struggle. If one is not ideologically prepared for prolonged struggle, when imperialism is so powerful, one may be disappointed. Second, please rely mainly on your own efforts, seeking foreign assistance only as a subsidiary." ("The current task in Africa is to oppose imperialism, not capitalism"). If, as some people think, Chairman Mao was already fanatical at this time, he should have told the African people to build communism quickly, how could he have urged them to "prepare for a long struggle"?

 

Judging from these articles, during the Great Leap Forward, Chairman Mao's mind was always very calm, and he was not at all carried away by the victory of the Chinese revolution and the great achievements of socialist construction. Chairman Mao did not make any major mistakes at all during the "Great Leap Forward" campaign and the People's Commune Movement, definitely not as the official line claims: "What's more, because Comrade Mao Zedong ...... grew complacent in the face of victory and was eager for success, he exaggerated the role of subjective will and subjective effort... made the left-leaning errors, mainly marked by high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and the 'communist wind', spread seriously." On the contrary, it was he who was always correcting the mistakes of others. As he himself said in April 1959, " In comparison with the high-sounding talks currently making the rounds what I am saying here is very much low-keyed...... If it (production) is not actually as low as I make it out to be and it has achieved a relatively higher target… then heavens, if that is so. It will be a great honor indeed.”

 

Studying these writings of Chairman Mao, I also have the feeling that the Old Man was always fighting with the masses against the entire bureaucratic clique. This is very helpful for us to understand that he started the Cultural Revolution against those in power who had taken the capitalist road. This is the reason why so many powerful people are trying to defame, slander and spread disinformation about Chairman Mao.

 

The second volume of the Party History sinisterly says, "Since the severe criticism of the anti-rash advances, the democratic life of the Party leadership began to be abnormal, paternalism and one-word style prevailed, and ...... described the accomplishment of many high targets and work tasks that were out of touch with reality as a serious political problem ", "so that acting on the basis of subjective will and subjective wishes, hot-headedness and eagerness to achieve, ...... becomes unavoidable"[26]. Who is paternalistic and monolithic? It doesn't say who.

 

But look again in the next paragraph and you'll see why I call them sinister. "This kind of hot-headedness was not only found in Mao Zedong, but also in other central leaders, and it was more common among party cadres at that time", it seems that everyone had their share of shortcomings and mistakes, but no one would associate them with those who were "always right", such as Hu Yaobang and so on, they would have put all the blame on Chairman Mao alone. But the problem is that "this hot-headed phenomenon" has nothing to do with Chairman Mao at all, it is pure disinformation, planting and framing! It is a strange story that

history!

 

In fact, after studying the writings of Mao, Liu, Zhou, Chen and Deng, I feel that it would have been better if Chairman Mao had really been patriarchal and monolithic, and that his "personal autocratic style" had come not too early but too late. Had there been earlier arbitrariness and "undermining of the Party's democratic centralism", the left-leaning mistakes of high targets, arbitrariness, boastfulness and the "communist wind" might have been corrected long ago, and the situation in China during the three years of natural disasters might have been much better.

 

Assuming that leaders at all levels had stocked up on some food as he asked, how could there be a famine as severe as it later became? How nice it would be if Chairman Mao really said something!

 

May 15, 2014

 

大跃进如何受到干扰和破坏？ - 乌有之乡 (wyzxwk.com)

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[1] Regarded as one of the Five Classics of Chinese literature, characterised by the use of subtle and guarded language in criticism.

[2] Not in the English edition

[3] Now available as pdfs at BANNEDTHOUGHT.NET - China - Writings of Specific Individuals.

[4] small-scale operations using indigenous methods including “home-made” blast furnaces

[5] Li Fuchun (1900-75), a native of Changsha, Hunan Province, was then a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, vice leader of the Central Financial and Economic Group, Vice-Premier of the State Council and concurrently Minister in Charge of the State Planning Cmisomsion

[6] Bo Yibo (1908-2007) held successive posts as Communist China's inaugural Minister of Finance, a member of the Communist Party's Politburo, Vice-Premier, chairman of State Economic Commission, and vice-chairman of the party's Central Advisory Commission. His son Bo Xilai became Party leader in Chongqing where he popularised the singing of Cultural Revolution-era songs and promoted a “left” political line.  He was charged with corruption and purged by Xi Jinping in 2012.

[7] Zhao Erlu (1905-67), a native of Guoxian County (now Yuanping County), Shanxi Province, was then a member of the Central Financial and Economic Group and Minister of the First Ministry of Machine-Building Industry

[8] Wang Heshou, ( l 909- ), a native of Tangxian County, Hebei Province, was then member of the Central Financial and Economic Group and Minister of Metallurgical Industry.

[9] The author’s attitude towards Chen Yun is interesting. I have tucked away inside my Vol 1 of Chen Yun’s Selected Works a cutting from the capitalist press of March 21, 1989. It’s a report on the National People’s Congress meeting at which the absence of both Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun (head of the CCP’s Advisory Commission) was noted.  The article claims that there was growing discontent over the direction of Deng’s “reforms”, and says: “Chen Yun, an elderly but powerful economist was reported to have said recently: ‘The entire ideological field has been taken over by capitalism. Not one proletarian thing survives. If ideological work is not done well, a regime can be overthrown.’” The Tiananmen Square protests began three weeks later, on April 15. On October 8 the previous year, he had said of one of Deng’s major reforms that “Institution of the contract responsibility system in enterprises has both positive and negative aspects”. On September 8, 1989 he warned the Central Committee about imperialism’s pursuit of “peaceful evolution” and said that it was “harmful and completely wrong to judge Lenin's theory about imperialism as currently outdated”. 

[10] Also available as pdfs at the Banned Thought website, or now in hard copy from the Paris-based Foreign Language Press (Foreign Languages Press – Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Publishing House )

[11] The author uses the respectful 老人家 (laorenjia) when referring to Mao. It is different to the English “old man” (老人) which can be disrespectful.

[12] The Chinese original has the expression 压缩空气 (yasuo kongqi) which literally means to compress air. A wider meaning in relation to written work would to cut it back, or even more broadly, to express oneself more modestly, which is the sense in which I’ve used it.

[13] Chaohu, or Lake Chao, is wholly situated in Hefei, the capital of Anhui Province. It is the largest lake in Anhui and one of the five largest freshwater lakes in China.

[14] There are actually five pieces, but the author only refers to three of them.

[15] i.e. the first one quoted from – it is actually the second piece.

[16] The third in the series, but the second one quoted from.

[17] Zhu De

[18] On September 3, 1958 the People's Daily published an editorial, "Raising the red flag of the people's commune". It refers to the basic characteristics of a people's commune: one is that they are big and the other is that they are public. “Big” means that the commune is large enough to facilitate large-scale integrated production and construction, and “public” means that "the people's commune is more socialist and collective than the agricultural production co-operatives."

[19] “One flat, two transfers” is short for "egalitarianism" and for "transfer without compensation". It emerged at the beginning of the commune movement in China's rural areas. It denied the economic differences within the people's communes, especially between the production co-operatives and the communes, and the principles of distribution according to labour and exchange of prices. It transferred the means of production, products, labour and capital of the various collective economic organisations to the commune or from the production team to the production brigade, without compensation. consolidation and development.

[20] P. 498 of Vol 2 of the History of the Chinese Communist Party.

[21] In the FLP (Paris) edition and the Banned Thought website, the title is given as “Comment on Tan Luqie’s Report on the Five-level Cadre Conference”.

[22] Held from August 17-30, 1958

[23] Held from November 28 to December 10, 1958.

[24] Held from April 2-5, 1959

[25] Tofu dregs engineering refers to cutting corners in construction projects that lead to the collapse of related buildings or non-compliance with regulations.

[26] History of the Communist Party of China (Volume II) p. 502